Цитата(root11 @ 28.02.2017, 00:46)
Быть может просто не форсируются события. По причине того, что ВС потенциальных противников имеют слишком слабую зависимость от спутниковых систем. В отличии от США. Интересно, есть оценки возможной трансформации технологий ведения боевых действий армии США, если внезапно исчезнет джи-пи-эс и спутниковые каналы связи ?...
Здравая, как всегда, мысль.
Администрация Обамы, напр., придерживалась подобной позиции - мол, гонка в этой области не не пользу США в ввиду сильной зависимости от космических средств. (Не совсем, правда, ясно почему в 1983 г. в ответ на SDI СССР объявил односторонний мораториум на испытания анти-спутникового оружия, которого он+Россия фактически придерживались до недавнего времени)
Однако мне попалась на глаза статья, где замечалось, что, например, в контексте конфликта с Китаем (который имеет действующих спутников на орбите больше чем Россия) США обладают гораздо большой избыточностью средств чем Китай и имееет альтернативы спутникам там, где Китай совсем не имеет альтернативы своему космосу - как, например, в наблюдении над океаном...
По поводу возможного эффекта ASAT на ведение боевых действий США вики напр. пишет:
Цитата
While it has been suggested that a country intercepting the satellites of another country in a conflict, namely between China and the United States, could seriously hinder the latter's military operations, the ease of shooting down orbiting satellites and their effects on operations has been questioned. Although satellites have been successfully intercepted at low orbiting altitudes, the tracking of military satellites for a length of time would be less accurate than previous commercial or defective intercepts that did not employ any defensive measure like simple inclination changes. Depending on the level of tracking capabilities, the interceptor would have to pre-determine the point of impact while compensating for the satellite's lateral movement and the time for the interceptor to climb and move; U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites orbit at about 800 km (500 mi) high and move at 7.5 km/s (4.7 mi/s), so a Chinese Intermediate-range ballistic missile would need to compensate for 1,350 km (840 mi) of movement in the three minutes it takes to boost to that altitude. Even if an ISR satellite is knocked out, the U.S. possesses an extensive array of manned and unmanned ISR aircraft that could perform missions at standoff ranges from Chinese land-based air defenses, making them somewhat higher priority targets that would consume fewer resources to better engage.[20]
Global Positioning System and communications satellites orbit at higher altitudes of 20,000 km (12,000 mi) and 36,000 km (22,000 mi) respectively, putting them out of range of solid-fueled Intercontinental ballistic missiles. Liquid-fueled space launch vehicles could reach those altitudes, but they are more time-consuming to launch and could be attacked on the ground before being able to launch in rapid succession. The constellation of 30 GPS satellites provides redundancy where at least four satellites can be received in six orbital planes at any one time, so an attacker would need to disable at least six satellites to disrupt the network. Even if this is achieved, signal degradation only lasts for 95 minutes, leaving little time to take much decisive action, and backup inertial navigation systems (INS) would still be available for relatively accurate movement as well as laser guidance for weapons targeting.
For communications, the Naval Telecommunications System (NTS) used by the U.S. Navy uses three elements: tactical communications among a battle group; long-haul communications between shore-based forward Naval Communications Stations (NAVCOMSTAs) and deployed afloat units; and strategic communication connecting NAVCOMSTAs with National Command Authorities (NCA). The first two elements use line-of-sight (25–30 km (13–16 nmi; 16–19 mi)) and extended line-of-sight (300–500 km (160–270 nmi; 190–310 mi)) radios respectively, so only strategic communications are dependent on satellites. China would prefer to cut off deployed units from each other and then negotiate with the NCA to have the battle group withdraw or stand down, but ASATs could only achieve the opposite. Even if somehow a communications satellite were hit, a battle group could still perform its missions in the absence of direct guidance from the NCA.[20]
В результате, имхо, не так уж просто найти убедительные доводы для разных стран в которых затраты на ASAT оправданы с военной, экономической и/или стратегической точки зрения.